

TEACH Journal of Christian Education

Manuscript 1472

When is 'Social Science' an Oxymoron?

Stephen J. Fyson Dr

Follow this and additional works at: <https://research.avondale.edu.au/teach>



Part of the [Education Commons](#), and the [Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons](#)

When is ‘Social Science’ an oxymoron?

Stephen Fyson

Alphacrucis College, Parramatta, NSW
stephen.fyson@westnet.com.au

Keywords: Personhood, reality, research, social science

Abstract

How often do we hear the phrase, “The research says”, in our discussions about improving teaching and learning? What do we mean by the term “research”? Often this concept is used with the assumption that something like the “scientific method” has been used to describe educational reality in a way that can help us in our teaching.

This thinking, in turn, assumes the validity of education being part of the ‘social sciences’. But what do we mean by, “social science”? For some, it means using statistical methods to help us discover cause and effect within teaching practice. This can involve the use of *qualitative* as well as *quantitative* methodologies.

Yet it is not uncommon to hear people use phrases such as “But what do the hard data show?” Or, “Was this a real / ‘solid’ / large enough piece of research?” Such misgivings rely on the assumption that if we use the same scientific methods as the physical sciences (which can be referred to as the ‘natural’ or ‘hard’ sciences), then the research is more creditable. This article will review two core difficulties with these assumptions—inappropriateness and ineptness—and then review some suggestions in approaching research about humans more aptly and more appropriately, in order to avoid social science research that may become contradictory in terms.

What is real for our research?

The distinction between different aspects of life has been recognized for a long time. One of the earliest (if not the earliest) reflection on these categories from a Christian teaching perspective was in *On Christian Teaching* (Augustine, 427/2009):

... there are two kinds of learning pursued even in pagan society. One consists of things which have

been instituted by humans, the other consists of things already developed, or divinely instituted, which have been observed by them. ... Now those elements of human tradition which men did not establish but discovered by investigation, whether they were enacted in time or instituted by God, should not be considered human institutions, no matter where they are learnt.

(pp.47 & 54)

Augustine is here alerting his students that they could observe aspects of reality instituted by God, but they could also discern ways of thinking about reality apart from God’s revelation. Augustine noted that this kind of study could be applied by Christians in and outside the Church:

A person who is a good and true Christian should realize that truth belongs to his Lord, wherever it is found, gathering and acknowledging it even in pagan literature, but rejecting superstitious vanities and deploring and avoiding those who ‘though they knew God did not glorify him as God’.

(p.47)

Yet we can already see in these two quotes that even though there are different kinds of knowledge, the purpose of the knowledge is also critical. As Augustine noted, our knowledge either invites us to love God and others more, or the contrary. This reflects the explanation about wisdom and foolishness given to us by the Apostle Paul when reflecting on how God chose to reveal Christ to us (1 Corinthians 1:21-24, NIV):

21 For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom did not know him, God was pleased through the foolishness of what was preached to save those who believe. 22 Jews demand signs and Greeks look for wisdom, 23 but we preach Christ crucified: a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, 24 but to those whom God has called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God

(NIV)

For that reason, when we are searching for what is true as Christians, scripture reminds us that there are spiritual realities at work. That is one reason that St Augustine was so clear about the proper *purpose* of what it is that we study, or in contemporary terminology, of what we are *researching*.

Consequently Augustine (427/2008) explained

“

Augustine is here alerting his students that they could observe aspects of reality instituted by God, but they could also discern ways of thinking about reality apart from God’s revelation.

”

that, even though “This whole area of human institutions which contribute to the necessities of life should in no way be avoided by the Christian; indeed, within reason, they should be studied and committed to memory” (p. 54), we should be wise in how we evaluate the worth of what we study, for example: “Of [those areas of study] instituted by humans, some are superstitious, some are not” (p. 47).

Where does “social science” fit into Augustine’s reflections? The starting place for such a consideration is understanding the nature of personhood, so that we can then ask, “What kind of research – or science – appropriately helps us understand the reality of human beings in relationship?” This is the realm of the appropriateness of our research.

“
many people today stand uncertain about the meaning or lucidity of the very notion of a coherent self or person, unclear about what a person essentially is
”

What is a person?

The basic presuppositions about human beings are presented from the beginning of Scripture. There, God is asserted as the Creator. No attempt at an apologetic is made. We have simply the statement that God is, He speaks, and good happens.

Part of that good is making the universe inhabitable. Genesis 1-2 describes how this order needs development and maintenance, and the task given to human beings is to continue to do the good the Creator started. All human beings carry this mandate, to be good stewards of God’s creation. Gender differences do not diminish the mandate to be God’s representatives on earth. Difference provides the opportunity for each to serve the other (Walton, 2015; Broughton-Knox, 1989).

This ‘imageness’ requires what we call “self-transcendence” (Vitz cited in Vitz & Felch, 2006)—the capacity to think and expand one’s consciousness beyond self (Lennox, 2020; Swinburne, 2013). This is different to the capacities of animals, vegetation or rocks.

At times, in research publications, the wonder of being human is discussed. However, in many standard educational research articles and in books, it is simply ignored. It is not assumed but ignored. How can one tell the difference? If our “soulness”, or moral agency was being assumed, it would be openly considered when we are trying to describe and measure what we do in social science. But it rarely is given consideration. More than that, some, including Scruton (2019) and Kanpol and Poplin (2017), have identified barriers to spiritual knowledge being allowed into mainstream social science.

What we are proposing here is a relationship between how we understand personhood, and how we research people in relationships. Smith

(2011) undertook a detailed consideration of this issue as a research sociologist. A summary of his four hundred- and ninety-five-page volume could not do it justice, but his main points may be helpful for our consideration of how we decide what is appropriate in social science research, based on our assumptions of what it means to be a person. In particular, how can we use the methods of the natural sciences within social science?

Smith’s (2011) starting point is that good theory about anything that is “social” needs to be grounded—understood and explicated—in an understanding of the nature of persons. His suggestion is that this carries with it certain complications because: “many people today stand uncertain about the meaning or lucidity of the very notion of a coherent self or person, unclear about what a person essentially is” (p.5).

As Trueman (2020) noted, we live in a time when someone can say, “I am a woman trapped in a woman’s body” and that statement is “regarded as coherent and meaningful” (p.19). Smith (2011) explained this uncertainty about the nature of persons as being, because we do not test our presuppositions about the nature of who we are routinely enough:

Are we simply self-conscious animals improbably appearing for a moment in a cosmos without purpose or significance? ... Are we instead really materially acquisitive hedonists or carnally desiring sensualists who have nothing higher to which to aspire than the gratifications of possessions and physical sensations that we can use... Or perhaps are we children of a personal God, whose perfect love is determined to rescue us from our self-destruction in order to bring us into the perfect happiness of divine knowledge and worship? (p.7)

The implications for research about persons in relationship is greatly impacted depending on which alternatives we choose. Coe (cited in Coe & Hall, 2010) has explained how contemporary psychology has given up on ‘psyche’ and progressively denied the spirit. The consequence was “quantification”, which assumes that human life can be best understood by using the number system of the naturalistic scientific method. He noted that contemporary psychology is therefore basically secular (in the materialist sense), and therefore has “found no home for the ‘person’ in the scientific academy” (p.213). This, explained Coe, has direct implications for how we undertake research in psychology/social science: “As the ‘science’ of quantification slowly became the language of knowledge in the university, the study of ethics, the ‘person’ (and not just the body) and God would more and more be moved out of the university” (p. 124).

This, as Blamires (1963/2005) warned fifty years

ago, leads to individuals within the Church not having a Christian mind. Blamires, like Chesterton (1910/2015) before him, also explained how this meant that Christian thinking would progressively be *in absentia* in general society.

Smith (2011) explained that this assumption – of a privatised faith in the world of social science research – is based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of a theory. Smith also warned against the quantification-type processes described by Coe (2010). He noted that this kind of reductionist starting point makes people-focussed research “predicting observable outcomes and events” only fit to be “tossed into the dustbin” (p.11). Instead, Smith explained that theories about people in relationships, and the attendant research based on these theories, should be focussed on the reality that includes physical and non-physical aspects of reality:

Human beings, I will suggest, are free, **ensouled** creatures of a particular kind... When it comes to the human, therefore, reductionistic moves towards either the physical or the mental, the material or the ideal, the corporeal or the spiritual are unacceptable and self-defeating. Humans are **embodied souls** who can only be well understood and explained in light of the complex reality. (p. 22 – emphases added)

Of course, there are different theological ways of expressing this ‘non-physical aspect of human reality.’ Smith’s use of words is one way. It is important to note the diverse views of what a human soul is. But the intention of this discussion is to also acknowledge that theistic faiths recognise human experience beyond the tangible—a non-physical reality—and reflect on some implications of this for our social science research within Christian education.

Implications for research relating to human beings

Other philosophers and researchers confirm the need to be more realistic with reference to how we attempt to describe reality for human beings. For example, when exploring the difference between science and scientism, Moreland (2018) highlighted that when research about human life is limited to the physical aspects of reality, then “our moral and spiritual claims will be ‘de-cognitived’ ... [that is,] unworthy of rational consideration” (p. 31). This forces our spiritual beliefs to be considered as “neither factual in nature nor subject to rational evaluation” (p. 34).

Moreland (2018) outlined how scientism is bad for science per se, marginalising for Christian faith at best, and fallacious as a way to teach and think

about the deeper truths of life, at worst.

In a similar vein, Dirckx (2019) explored whether our thinking as humans can be reduced to the functions of the brain. If we are “just our brains”, then naturalist research methods should be highly efficacious. As Dirckx surveyed possible alternative frameworks in considering the brain and mind relationship, with reference to how and what humans think, she noted that, “In sum, there are persuasive reasons to discount the view that consciousness is the brain, from philosophy, neuroscience and medicine” (p. 54).

Dirckx (2019) then explored theoretical constructs that attempted to explain human choice-making. She explained that determinism, in any form, cannot adequately explain the kinds of “intentional causation” (quoting Swinburne, 2013) that is evidenced in human thinking. With reference to research techniques, this means that the brain cannot explain human choice-making, nor can techniques that rely on such deterministic assumptions. This is because “brain processes and human experience are two different things ... brain data tells us nothing about why the person has chosen” (p. 111).

This Biblical understanding, which Dirckx described as being supported by neuroscience (her field), also provides a basis for accountability for our choices. If our students are only defined by their physical capacities and socially determined experiences, then naturalistic science would give us, as their teachers, both control *and* responsibility for their choices. That is a different world from the one of sin, grace and forgiveness that we find in Christ, in Scripture (Siedentop, 2014). The Biblical world of people being made in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27) is a different world that explains the realities of life much more fully, than a reductionist, quantified and deterministic framework would suggest.

Swinburne (2013) unpacked this difficulty—of the brain and mind being different, and the implications for measurement—by reminding his readers that “Mathematical relations can hold only between properties which have degrees, greater or less, which can be measured on some scale” (p. 188). However, when using various research scales (e.g., Likert scales), we ask people to respond to hypotheticals that don’t facilitate participants giving authentic and meaningful answers. Our statistical manipulations to demonstrate *reliability* of the items then do not help us with whether we are really tapping into the meaning of that item for that person, specifically its *validity*. For:

All of this suggests that we could **not** derive from data about what a subject believed that they would do

“
brain
processes
and human
experience
are two
different
things ...
brain data
tells us
nothing about
why the
person has
chosen
”

under different circumstances any **absolute** situation-independent numerical values of the strengths of their beliefs or desires. ... Again, we could only have a long list of the kinds of brain activity which increases or decreases the strength of which kinds of mental events.

(Swinburne, 2013, pp. 194 & 188 – emphases added)

This speaks to the aptness, or otherwise, of our research methods as applied to people – that is, What are the proper uses of the scientific method when incorporated into social science? Ritchie (2020) outlined difficulties with fraud, bias, negligence and hype across many disciplines, including many in the physical sciences. However, for psychology and related disciplines, he reserved this assessment:

Psychologists have the unenviable job of trying to understand highly variable and highly complicated human beings ... [it is] difficult, if not impossible, to pin down in a lab experiment.... Could the sheer complexity of the task make findings in psychology particularly untrustworthy, compared to other sciences? ... There is something to this argument ... (p. 32)

So many of our social science studies that we cite do not demonstrate that they have controlled all the variables that constitute the *full* reality of human experience. This includes the wonderful, mysterious and complex world of the classroom. This is why Lennox (2020), after describing the state of artificial intelligence and the hopes of many who have high dreams for AI, noted that “the immateriality of information presents a categorical barrier to the construction of a material machine (computer) that can consciously understand in any meaningful sense” (p. 117). In the same way, reducing complicated human experiences, like teaching and learning, to a machine based (computer) algorithm, inevitably is missing important meaning about the humans involved.

Where does this leave us with our question - “When is social science an oxymoron?” The arguments described to date would at least suggest that when we attempt to use natural scientific method with persons, we run the risk of doing science that can be both inappropriate (it does not address the reality of our natures) and / or inept (it does not capture what it says it does). Some of the implications of this dynamic will now be described.

Some implications for educational research

One implication of the difficulties in capturing the meaning of human ideas and actions is to be careful, to the point of being humble, with whatever we describe in social science research. Ritchie (2020) made this point with reference to the common carelessness that occurs in reporting

correlative studies. Researchers can give a false impression of reality when they use descriptors such as “variable A produced effect X”, or that “his survey clearly demonstrated”... . Correlational studies do not describe causation.

This isn’t saying that there is nothing worthwhile to report through observational data that has not been gathered under the strict procedures of the scientific method (like randomised groupings in controlled contexts). As Ritchie (2020) noted:

That’s nothing to be ashamed of: there’s a lot we can learn about how things relate to each other in the world and building up an accurate picture of patterns of correlation is an essential foundation for understanding systems like the brain or society. We need to be awfully careful about how we interpret those correlations, however. (p. 150)

That is why, when researchers are not reporting physical causation according to naturalistic science methods, results are best presented with appropriate transparency and descriptive language. Ritchie gave the negative example of Dweck’s “mindset” research, which he explained was over-reported (“hyped”) based on her initial data and findings:

The risk of such overhyping is that teachers and politicians begin to view ideas like mindset as a kind of panacea for education, focusing time and resources on them that might be better spent on dealing with the complex web of social, economic and other reasons that some children fail at school. (p.153)

Beyond being careful when observations are being reported, is the consideration of the nature of the knowledge sources being used, if we wish to reflect more realistically about life and learning. Kanpol and Poplin (2017) collected essays to describe how there is what they describe as a “secular border control” to keep spiritual sources of knowledge out of the Academy. Poplin’s contribution to that volume explained how real spiritual transactions are observed and reported through secular lenses (even by Christians). This is consistent with Willard (2009), who similarly described the increasing lack of acceptance of a Christian view of life portraying reality. Willard explained that the shift towards secularism has been derived from the marginalisation of God because of the untested no-God assumptions that have developed about reality (“worldviews”).

Willard (2009) noted the result is that: in their effort to be in control of knowledge, *they have redefined knowledge*, through “specialization” and “professionalisation”, in such a way that it cannot deal with those [worldview] questions. So real life—which must assume answers—is, as a matter of fact, abandoned by our “knowledge institutions” to feeling, force, politics and “traditions”. Ragtag, incoherent

“
the
immateriality
of information
presents a
categorical
barrier to the
construction
of a material
machine
(computer)
that can
consciously
understand
in any
meaningful
sense”
”

“answers” float here and there, with no responsible clarification and critique.
(p. 57, emphases in the original)

Willard thus proposed that Christians need to challenge the incoherent claim of those who promote the scientism referred to by Moreland. He declared that the secularisation of knowledge will continue until:

institutions of Christian higher education and their faculties break out of a posture that holds genuine knowledge to be secular, and until they carry out their task of developing and conveying distinctively Christian knowledge – in free, open, and rational manner that characterises the life of the mind and of scholarship at its ideal best – those institutions will, despite all appearances, be a primary *hindrance* to the “Jesus project” on earth.
(p. 208, emphases in the original)

Suggestions for improvement

Moreland (cited in Coe & Hall, 2010) added some specific suggestions for Christian educators if they wished to move beyond reductionist and reality-denying ways of describing the social aspects of life, even at the school level: “As Christians, our goal is to make Christian ideas relevant to our subject matter appear to be true, beautiful, good and reasonable to increase the ranking of Christian ideas in the culture’s plausibility structure” (p.21).

Perhaps if Christian researchers want to avoid the oxymoronic use of social science research, then they also may need to explore how accepting different knowledge sources can inform the plausibility structures of their disciplines. Such a broader base, that includes a biblical base for knowledge, would include exploration of respective theological and philosophical descriptions of reality.

Smith (2011) came close to this point when lamenting the state of social science research, after describing the embodied soulness of persons. Similarly to Ritchie (2020), Smith explained the great lack of reality description within most tests of statistical significance in social science research, because they:

tell us mostly about the size of our sample, not about the strength of association between variables, since sample size dramatically affects the ability to find significant differences. ... On the other hand, nearly any association can be found statistically with a large enough sample size.
(p.283)

How then, can causation be understood in the context of persons in relationship to the world and others? Smith (2011) noted that causality for humans is real because it does happen, but that it is not because of the naturalistic assumptions of mechanical laws. If we bring these assumptions

to social science research, then our findings dramatically remain “hypothetical or fictionalised causation.”¹ For Smith:

Causation is a matter of the operation of often non-observable yet real powers and mechanisms that naturally exist at different levels of reality and operate (or not) under certain conditions and in particular combinations to tend to produce characteristic results.

(p. 292)¹

In the spirit of Kuhn (1962) and Polyani (1969), Smith (2011) concluded his reflections, noting the critical importance to acknowledge that even though reality is objective (he used the term of being a ‘realist’), we engage with this knowledge personally. To pretend otherwise brings its own ignorance: “Scientific knowledge without personal knowledge amounts to ignorant proceduralism.” (p.297)

This is why there has been a growing interest in alternative ways of describing aspects of reality. Termed “qualitative” research methods, these frameworks invite understanding people’s stories – about our students and teachers – without attempting to reduce the events to a series of manipulated numbers. There are many introductory texts that explain how qualitative methodologies work².

For example, the field of qualitative research has seen the following methodologies develop (and there are many combinations of these that can be used):

Ethnography method, where one works “from within” a community to understand their lived experiences

Narrative method, where one works to understand and describe the experiences of others in the form of a cohesive story

Phenomenological method, which is focussed on understanding the lived experiences from different perspectives, through use of exploring different presuppositions, or basic assumptions

Grounded Theory method, where the researchers work to come to a theory on the basis of what they learn from the people involved

“
our goal is to make Christian ideas ... matter, appear to be true, beautiful, good and reasonable to increase the ranking of Christian ideas in the culture’s plausibility structure
”

¹ We should also acknowledge that for some researchers, they may use the term ‘causation’ as an indication of a tendency towards cause and effect, and in doing so, are not implying the mechanistic assumptions of physical cause and effect.

² An example would be Merriam, S.B. & Tisdell, E.J. (2016) *Qualitative Research: A guide to design and implementation*. Jossey-Bass.

“
Our theories, in turn, are developed not by studying statistical output printouts but by employing our best personal, substantive knowledge as participants in reality about how reality operates”

Case Study method, where the experience, person or event is described in great detail, with reference to a theory or theories

The principles at the end of this paper are suggested as one way that we might encourage each other in how to use and develop these and other ways of approaching our research.

And again, similarly to Ritchie (2020), Smith (2011) acknowledged that this change in orientation may make a difference to our publication habits: “Publish or perish be damned, in this case, because truth and reality are more important than curriculum vitae and careers” (p.311).

However, it is not being suggested that we stop researching people. As indicated from some of the quotes by Smith (2011), there is a move to what he and others call Christian critical realism (Cooling et al., 2017; Edlin, 2018). Holmes (1977) expressed this using the Augustinian notion of all truth being God’s truth. As noted above, this means recognising God as the starting point of reality, but also recognising our imperfect capacity to engage fully in understanding this reality.

In a series of lectures to Christian educators in Sydney in 1992, Glenn Martin (1993) outlined how Christians can start this process of engaging imperfectly with the seen and unseen aspects of God’s reality:

Biblical Christian thinking is the recognition that, because God is Alpha and Omega, everything other than God is relative. God alone is absolute and changeless. Therefore, nothing can be understood ultimately except in relationship with God. Accordingly, in Romans 12:2 we are instructed not to be conformed to this age, but to be transformed by the renewing of our minds that, thinking the thoughts of God after Him, we may implement the good, acceptable, and perfect will and way of God.

(p. 9)

This is why in his discussion about why scientism cannot explain human consciousness, Moreland also gave an insight into alternative processes to the common, natural scientific ones, when working to understand non-physical aspects of reality: “Simple introspection—combined with biblical, theological and philosophical reflection—is the most rational and very best way to learn facts about the *nonphysical nature of mental properties and mental/conscious states*” (p. 90, emphases in the original).

Smith’s suggestion for a collegial starting point follows logically: “Our theories, in turn, are developed not by studying statistical output printouts but by employing our best personal, substantive knowledge as participants in reality about how reality operates” (2011, p. 294).

Ritchie (2020) similarly shares some practical wisdom about how to help each other to be better researchers. His suggestions include:

- a. Sharing our uncertainties about our methods and findings more openly; and
- b. Starting the sharing sooner – Ritchie commends the “open science” research movement, where researchers share not only their results more humbly, but also their plans before they start researching, including their raw data. They can also share their initial findings for comment, before publication.

Perhaps we need a Christian educator’s research forum to enable such a commitment?

Thus, the best science in which we can engage within Christian education is one that places God at the centre of our thinking, reasoning and logic while we share ideas, parameters, and methods with each other on collaborative journeys. From that starting presupposition and practice, we can then explore the unseen and seen aspects of reality with open, logical and well-reasoned descriptions of what we observe. What we ‘observe’ can be those aspects of life that are external, and those aspects of life that ‘live’ in the realm of ideas and experience.

We might then do what Augustine encouraged in 427AD – to discover more of God’s physical creation, while discerning the spiritual aspects of life that also inform us more of what God has done. Following Augustine’s advice, we would simultaneously discern between those human institutions which are “superstitious” and those that are in accord with God’s ways (even Augustine agreed that all truth is God’s truth, wherever it is found).

He would also remind us that this is a prayerful endeavour, and that this characteristic is most evidenced in “the life of the speaker” (teacher). All of this is to be done within the ‘two-fold love’, which is the deepest purpose for any Christian who is a teacher: the love of God and the love of others.

Hopefully then, in truthful, transparent and gracious relationships, we should view oxymoronic social science research with a critical eye, and also be cognizant of and open to exploring alternative methodologies when researching human behaviour. **TEACH**

References

- Augustine, A. (2008). *On Christian Teaching*. Oxford University Press. (Original work published 427AD)
- Blamires, H. (2005). *The Christian mind: How should a Christian think?* Regent College Publications. (Original work published 1963)

- Broughton-Knox, D. (1989). *Not by bread alone: God's word on present issues*. The Banner of Truth Trust.
- Chesterton, G. K. (2015). *What's wrong with the world?* Cavalier Classics. (Original work published 1910)
- Coe, J. H. & Hall, T. W. (2010). *Psychology in the Spirit: Contours of a transformational psychology*. IVP Academic.
- Cooling, T., Green, B., Morris, A., & Revell, L. (2017). *Christian faith in English Church School: Research conversations with classroom teachers*. Peter Lang Books.
- Dirckx, S. (2019). *Am I just my brain?* The Oxford Centre.
- Edlin, R. (2006). In pursuit of an authentic Christian paradigm: The place of reformed critical realism. In R. Edlin & J. Ireland (Eds.) *Engaging the Culture: Christians at work in education* (pp.91-108). National Institute for Christian Education.
- Holmes, A. F. (1977). *All truth is God's truth*. IVP.
- Kanpol, B., & Poplin, M. (2017). *Christianity and the secular border patrol: The loss of Judeo-Christian knowledge*. Peter Lang Publishers.
- Kuhn, T. S. (1962). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lennox, J. C. (2020). *2084 – Artificial intelligence and the future of humanity*. Zondervan Reflective.
- Martin, G. (1993). *Biblical Christian education: Liberation for leadership*. Azusa Pacific Fall Faculty Conference, October 29, Azusa Pacific University. (monograph).
- Moreland, J. P. (2018). *Scientism and secularism: Learning to respond to a dangerous ideology*. Crossway Books.
- Polanyi, M. (1969). *Knowing and being: Essays by Michael Polanyi*. University of Chicago Press.
- Ritchie, S. (2020). *Science fictions: Exposing fraud, bias, negligence and hype in science*. B. H. Books.
- Scruton, R. (2019). *Fools, frauds and firebrands: Thinkers of the new left*. Bloomsbury Continuum.
- Siedentop, L. (2014). *Inventing the individual: The origins of Western liberalism*. Penguin Books.
- Smith, C. (2011). *What is a person: Rethinking humanity, social life and the moral good from the person up*. Chicago University Press.
- Swinburne, R. (2013). *Mind, brain and free will*. Oxford University Press.
- Trueman, C. R. (2020). *The rise and triumph of the modern self: Cultural amnesia, expressive individualism, and the road to sexual revolution*. Crossway Books.
- Vitz, P. C. & Felch, S. M. (2006). *The self: Beyond the postmodern crisis*. ISIS Books.
- Walton, J. H. (2015). *The lost world of Adam and Eve: Genesis 2-3 and the human origins debate*. Intervarsity Press.
- Willard, D. (2009) *Knowing Christ today: Why we can trust spiritual knowledge*. Harper One.

Author information:

Stephen J Fyson is an Education Consultant for the Pacific Christian Group of Schools and a Senior Lecturer at Alphacrucis College; a psychologist by trade and teacher at heart. He has worked in Christian schools and colleges for over 30 years, and desires to see God placed where He belongs in what we teach and how we teach it.

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Master of Education is designed for teachers and school leaders wishing to pursue postgraduate study in Education through Coursework or Research.

To find out more about the Master of Education

scan the QR code or
phone +61 2 4980 2377 or
email study@avondale.edu.au

